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In societies severely divided by ethnicity, race, religion, language, or 
any other form of ascriptive affiliation, ethnic divisions make democ-
racy difficult, because they tend to produce ethnic parties and ethnic 
voting. An ethnic party with a majority of votes and seats can dominate 
minority groups, seemingly in perpetuity. Some version of this problem 
informs the politics of a great many severely divided societies.1 In se-
verely divided societies with ethnically based parties, ordinary majority 
rule usually results in ethnic domination. 
Two commonly proposed methods of amelioration are called con-
sociational and centripetal. Consociationalists generally try to solve 
the problem by establishing a regime of agreed guarantees, including 
proportional group participation in government and minority vetoes 
of ethnically sensitive policies. Their solution is to replace the adver-
sary democracy of government and opposition with a grand coalition 
of majorities and minorities. By contrast, centripetalists do not propose 
to substitute a consensual regime for majority rule, but attempt instead 
to create incentives, principally electoral incentives, for moderates to 
compromise on conflicting group claims, to form interethnic coalitions, 
and to establish a regime of interethnic majority rule. 
Both consociationalists and centripetalists presuppose that ethnic 
groups in severely divided societies will be represented by ethnically 
based parties. The goal of both is interethnic power sharing. Their dif-
ferences lie in contrasting conceptions of the best governing arrange-
ments for such societies. Consociationalists aim at mandatory postelec-
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toral governing coalitions of all ethnic antagonists who find their way 
into parliament through a proportional electoral system; centripetalists, 
by contrast, aim at voluntary preelectoral interethnic coalitions of mod-
erates. 
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Three problems that derive from these proposals ought to be of seri-
ous concern but are generally neglected in the literature on interethnic 
political conciliation. The first concerns the adoptability of either of the 
two principal prescriptions. Under what conditions can either be adopt-
ed? The second relates to a possibility inherent in centripetal regimes: 
the potential degradation of the electoral arrangements that sustain the 
interethnic coalition. The third derives from a common consequence of 
the adoption of a consociational regime: Where robust guarantees, in-
cluding minority vetoes, are adopted, immobilism is a strong possibility, 
and it may be very difficult to overcome the stasis that immobilism can 
produce. If we leave aside judgments about the relative merits of con-
sociationalism and centripetalism2—although some such judgments will 
inevitably intrude—and deal directly with the three problems, we shall 
see that they do not have really good solutions. By examining them, 
however, we can uncover some of the frailties inherent in both of the 
common prescriptions. 
A severely divided society is one in which ascriptive cleavages are 
highly salient in politics (more salient than alternative cleavages such as 
social class), a few groups contend for power at the center, and there is 
a history of interethnic antipathy. There are many such societies in Asia, 
Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and 
the Caribbean—the regions in which ethnic conflicts tend to be most 
intense. In these regions, 78 countries experienced one or more seri-
ous ethnic-conflict incidents between 1980 and 2010.3 Many of these 
countries would qualify as severely divided societies. Yet, in these three 
decades, only approximately 20 of the 78 managed to conclude intereth-
nic power-sharing agreements, or reach informal arrangements for shar-
ing power across group lines, or adopt regularized power-sharing prac-
tices in the absence of institutions mandating them. This count omits 
agreements that were intended to be merely temporary (for example, 
Kenya’s 2008 power-sharing deal), agreements between regimes and 
rebel formations that were not ethnically differentiated, and agreements 
that merely provided for regional autonomy or territorial devolution (or 
for federalism that amounted merely to devolution). The count is meant 
to capture arrangements for interethnic power sharing in the central 
government. (For a list of countries, see the Appendix on the Journal of 
Democracy website.)
In most respects, this count is biased toward finding cases of power 
sharing. All that is required for inclusion is the adoption of at least one 
consociational device or practice, or one centripetal device or practice, 
not a full ensemble of consociational or centripetal institutions. Even 
so, the number of adoptions is not very impressive. Moreover, many 
such agreements were aborted immediately upon adoption, were never 
implemented, or were abandoned within the first three years. Among the 
unimplemented, several resulted in civil war, one in genocide (Rwanda 
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in 1993), and one in secession (Sudan in 2005). Among the nine that 
proved durable, several eventually yielded fragile, immobile, or un-
democratic polities with uncertain prospects. Only a handful—between 
four and six, depending on how one chooses to count—could be said to 
have achieved a reasonable degree of sustained power sharing, and even 
among these there are some serious political pathologies. 
This article, then, concerns the difficulty of creating durable power-
sharing institutions. The focus is primarily on cases in which one group 
has a clear majority or a strong plurality, rather than those in which an 
array of groups contend for power, often forming shifting alliances. The 
first section deals with problems of adoption. The second explains why 
centripetal arrangements can degrade over time. The third discusses the 
stalemate that can afflict consociational arrangements and that helps to 
account for their durability—and durable stalemate is not what is typi-
cally intended when groups agree to conciliatory institutions. 
The Adoption Problem
The adoption problem is surpassingly important. Because the ob-
stacles are so many and so complex, I can provide only a taste here.4 
A well-kept secret among proponents of various prescriptions for inter-
ethnic accommodation is that they are rarely adopted. Moreover, very 
little thought has been given to the conditions under which particular 
prescriptions for severely divided societies can be adopted. 
The adoption problem is really a congeries of bargaining problems. 
A quick but incomplete enumeration should suffice to indicate the ob-
stacles to adoption of either consociational or centripetal institutions. 
First, there are asymmetric preferences. Majorities want majority 
rule; minorities want guarantees against majority rule. Consequently, 
minorities may prefer consociation; majorities do not. So a consocia-
tional regime can be adopted only when majorities (or large pluralities) 
are momentarily weak, often after periods of extended violence. At a 
later stage, when majorities regain their strength, they may overthrow 
it, as Greek Cypriots did in 1963 and as the Hutu in Burundi might be 
inclined to do now.
Second, there is general risk-aversion. Ethnic politics is a high-stakes 
game, and there are strong inclinations to stay with what is familiar. 
Third, negotiators do not come to the table innocent and naked. They 
have biases that rule in some models and rule out others. Often they 
favor institutions prevailing in the most successful democracies, which 
generally do not suffer from the most severe ethnic problems, or mod-
els derived from an ex-colonial power. There are also historical biases 
that induce decision makers to avoid repeating institutional choices that 
they associate with past mistakes, even though their reading of history 
is contestable or conditions may have changed. Biases narrow choices. 
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Fourth, there may be visibility of interests, the belief on the part of 
group leaders that they can foresee the relative benefits and costs for 
their group of alternative courses of action. The participants in negotia-
tions may think that they know what institutional choices are in their in-
terest, even though they may later be proved wrong about those choices.5 
Generally, the negotiations are not conducted under a veil of ignorance. 
The presumed visibility of interests also narrows choices. 
Fifth is the availability of alternatives. For example, when the negotia-
tions for a new dispensation follow an armed insurrection, it may be pos-
sible for the rebels to withdraw, return to the bush, and fight again, before 
or even after concluding an agreement, if its terms prove to be disadvanta-
geous. Attractive alternatives make a durable agreement harder to adopt.
This list of obstacles to agreement is enough to show why agreements 
to establish political institutions to conciliate ethnic conflict are much 
more rare than they might otherwise be. Many states that could benefit 
from accommodative institutions fail to adopt them. Far too little atten-
tion has been devoted to the adoption problem. 
More, however, needs to be said about one aspect of the problem. 
If asymmetric preferences mean that majorities will accept a regime of 
minority guarantees only when they are weak, when will they accept a 
centripetal regime? Such a regime rests on the willingness of moderates 
to appeal, at the margin, for the votes of members of groups other than 
their own and to form an interethnic vote-pooling coalition that can fend 
off challenges from monoethnic parties on the extreme flanks. There 
are two typical occasions for the adoption of measures to encourage 
such behavior. The first occurs when outside experts recommend such 
a regime. This, however, is a rare event, because international experts 
tend, for a variety of reasons, to favor proportional electoral systems and 
consociational guarantees.6 A more common occurrence is the need of a 
party of the majority group for the votes of the minority. When minority 
votes are unusually valuable, generally because the majority is divided 
between parties competing for its vote, it is possible to conclude a cen-
tripetal arrangement, in which group claims are compromised as votes 
are pooled by the two groups for parties from both. 
A good illustration comes from Malaysia, which long had a regime of 
conciliatory ethnic politics that was repeatedly misclassified as conso-
ciational.7 Malaysia had no grand coalition, no minority veto, no propor-
tionality—in fact, the Malay majority was greatly advantaged in gov-
ernment positions and financial allocations—and it was a thoroughly 
majoritarian democracy, characterized by a vigorous antinomy between 
government and opposition. What Malaysia did have was an interethnic 
coalition (known as the Alliance), flanked by ethnic opposition parties. 
That coalition was formed in the years before independence, when the 
leading Malay party needed votes from the Chinese minority to fend off 
a challenge from a party led by a charismatic Malay politician who had 
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been influential in opposing British plans for continued colonial rule af-
ter World War II.8 The result was a rather durable multiethnic coalition. 
(More on the Malaysian case in the next section.)
There is another occasion for the adoption of centripetal institu-
tions—when there is (as there usually is not) a Rawlsian veil of igno-
rance surrounding the negotiations.9 Such an occasion arises when the 
future of all groups is uncertain, as it was when Nigeria emerged from 
military rule in 1978 after pogroms, civil war, and a dozen years of dic-
tatorship. At that time, there was great fear of renewed ethnic conflict, 
but no group knew which group would be victimized next. One centrip-
etal device that was written into the constitution at that time and that 
has persisted in the current constitution is the requirement that a win-
ning candidate for president have support widely distributed across two-
thirds of the Nigerian states.10 Versions of this device have been adopted 
subsequently by Indonesia in 2002 and Kenya in 2010—which shows 
that there is some trade in centripetal institutions across continents and 
seas, just as there is of consociational institutions. 
Yet, the initial adoption problem is very serious indeed. Dealing with 
conflict-prone societies is difficult, as all three problems dealt with here 
show very well. 
The Degradation Problem
The degradation problem can afflict vote-pooling centripetal coali-
tions. It does so because of the familiar aversion of ethnic majorities to 
limits, whether consociational or centripetal, to unfettered ethnic major-
ity rule. For them, the good (ruling in a coalition) can be the enemy of 
the best (ruling alone). 
The Malaysian example serves well to illustrate the degradation prob-
lem. In Malaysia, as we have seen, the multiethnic Alliance had been 
established before independence in the 1950s. Malays and non-Malays 
(Chinese and Indians) were intermixed in many electoral constituencies. 
As a result, even under a decidedly unconsociational first-past-the-post 
electoral system, Alliance partners (Malay, Chinese, and Indian) in the 
center of the ethnopolitical spectrum, squeezed between Malay and non-
Malay extremists on the flanks, found it advantageous to pool Malay and 
non-Malay votes. It was a winning combination that led to negotiations 
for a constitution that embodied a compromise on ethnic claims and estab-
lished the enduring principle that “one-race government” was illegitimate. 
In short, electoral exigencies induced politicians to behave in ways that 
could attract votes from both sides of a very contentious ethnic divide. 
Slowly, however, certain underlying conditions changed. Because 
there were more Malay than non-Malay voters, the Malay partner in the 
coalition began to influence the apportionment of constituencies, already 
drawn to advantage rural Malay voters. Chinese voters were increasingly 
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packed into large, relatively homogeneous constituencies, where their 
votes would elect fewer candidates.11 Successive reapportionments in-
creased the weight of Malay voters. Then, after serious ethnic riots fol-
lowing the 1969 elections and a lapse in parliamentary rule of nearly two 
years, the coalition was broadened, reducing the influence of its Chinese 
component, and a new social contract was imposed by a new generation 
of Malay leaders that dramatically changed the balance of ethnic advan-
tage and disadvantage. In the years that followed, it became clear that 
the original conciliatory coalition had been weakened, even though its 
founding parties remained as members. Non-Malays were not disfran-
chised, but they lost their ability to affect a great many decisions of the 
central government, and they increasingly became opposition voters.12 
The story is more complicated than this summary indicates, but the 
increasing malapportionment of constituencies is instructive.13 The Achil-
les heel of electoral incentives as the route to durable interethnic accom-
modation is the weakness of the rule of law in many transitional countries. 
The establishment of nonpartisan electoral commissions that remain im-
partial and delimit boundaries according to neutral, legally specified cri-
teria depends on a vibrant rule of law. As the literature on the rule of law 
shows, the creation and maintenance of legal institutions strong enough to 
stand up to strong politicians tends to follow, rather than to precede, the 
establishment of democracies and to be dependent on a particular configu-
ration of political alignments.14 
This is not the place to deal with issues concerning the rule of law. It is 
useful, however, to note how valuable legal institutions can be in support-
ing conciliatory electoral (and other) arrangements for intergroup accom-
modation. In some states with independent and respected constitutional 
courts, it is possible to confide approval or review of new constituency 
boundaries to those courts, some of which already have jurisdiction to con-
firm electoral results. In many countries, however, constitutional courts 
have not managed to secure independence and respect, and in those the 
problem will remain. When electoral commissions and courts are unable to 
withstand pressure, centripetal arrangements can be vulnerable to slippage. 
It is also useful to recall that, just as majorities prefer majority rule to 
consociational guarantees, so too do they prefer untrammeled majority 
rule to centripetal regimes that provide minorities with the power to nego-
tiate compromise outcomes in arenas of ethnic policy. When centripetal 
regimes degrade, minority disaffection can rise to dangerous heights.15 
No Exit? The Immobilism Problem
The third problem is the inverse of the second. If centripetal arrange-
ments are sometimes subject to degradation, consociational arrange-
ments can be very difficult to modify. And modification is often de-
sired. Recall that consociational regimes can be established only when 
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majorities are, at least momentarily, weak. The inclusive government 
prescribed by consociational theory, coupled with the minority veto, is 
highly likely to produce the same majority resentment as may be present 
in centripetal regimes that are com-
mitted to compromise outcomes with 
minority participants. 
An interethnic arrangement of 
any sort allows ethnic demands and 
counterdemands to be made, but a 
consociational dispensation allows 
each participating group to block the 
claims and demands of other groups. 
The result is a system frequently im-
mobilized with respect to the very 
questions the agreement was made to 
settle. The stalemate, inability to get things done, and serious immo-
bilism that can follow give rise to a desire on the part of majorities to 
modify the consociational agreement. 
The need to renegotiate such arrangements, loosen them up, or make 
a transition to a different dispensation altogether has frequently been 
recognized. Some writers say that consociational guarantees are suitable 
for calming a conflict in times of crisis or civil war, but once tranquility 
has been achieved—and especially if immobilism sets in—it ought to 
be possible to move to other institutions. Timothy D. Sisk speaks of the 
“obsolescing pact.”16 Minority guarantees, he says, come into conflict 
with the need for a strong center, and they create instability; they may 
reify ethnic identity and foster “the inflexibility of representation” that 
is “the hallmark” of peace agreements.17 Echoing Pierre du Toit’s call 
for “post-settlement settlements,”18 Sisk advocates the renegotiation of 
consociational settlements but confesses that it is difficult to specify the 
means to accomplish this. Many commentators suggest that consocia-
tions tend to rigidify conflicts and do not lend themselves to renegotia-
tion. Most agree that consociational institutions, once established, are 
sticky. The wish for a possibility of a transition away from them has 
often been expressed, but no one has yet specified the location of the 
exit.19 
For the same reasons that majorities are reluctant to surrender power 
to a consociational regime, so too are they sorely tempted to abandon 
the consociational scheme. They continue to prefer majority rule or a 
civic—that is, wholly nonethnic—dispensation in which the majority 
will hold sway. Second-generation majority-group leaders, who did not 
create the agreement in the first place, may be impatient with it.20 Dis-
content with the consociational scheme has been greater among majori-
ties than among minorities in Northern Ireland, Belgium, Bosnia (where 
Bosniaks are at least a large plurality, perhaps now a majority), and 
For the same reasons that 
majorities are reluctant 
to surrender power to a 
consociational regime, 
so too are they sorely 
tempted to abandon the 
consociational scheme.
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Burundi. If there is a change in the balance of power existing at the time 
the agreement was made, leaders of the majority may opt out, as Greek 
Cypriots did in 1963. 
More often than not, escape is not so easy, because majorities will not 
be willing to incur the high costs that might attend attempts to leave the 
arrangements. Merely because an agreement has produced immobilism 
and discontent does not mean that its support is as decayed as its institu-
tions are feeble. Ineffective consociational dispensations do not simply 
wither away or give rise to more sustainable arrangements. There may 
be a strong constellation of interests holding the consociational status 
quo together. For one thing, minorities tend to be attached to the con-
sociational bargain. They may begin to have doubts about the bargain 
they made, as some Catholic nationalists have had in Northern Ireland, 
especially after the moderates of both groups who crafted the conso-
ciational deal were displaced at the center of power by more extreme 
parties, or as certain Bosnian Serbs and Croats have had, or as certain 
Walloons in Belgium have had. Yet they may fear the consequences of 
alternative arrangements more than they dislike the stalemated status 
quo. In Bosnia, the alternatives proposed from time to time—in 1999, in 
2006, three times in 2008–09, and then again in 2013—involve devia-
tions from strictly consociational institutions. Such changes as a dilution 
of veto powers, an end to exclusively ethnic representation, or a differ-
ent electoral system might weaken the hold of minority representatives 
on their voters and on the system. If those minority representatives have 
an option of resorting to armed force against changes deemed unfavor-
able, the possibility of violence is a strong disincentive for a dissatisfied 
majority to change. 
That disincentive is likely to prove quite persuasive to the surround-
ing support system of external actors who have a stake in the arrange-
ments, a stake usually acquired because they encouraged or cajoled the 
parties to the original agreement or even underwrote it. The British were 
wholeheartedly behind Turkish Cypriot claims to a consociational re-
gime in 1959–60. They also had no objection to the internal aspects of 
the Northern Ireland Agreement negotiated in 1998. The U.S. govern-
ment drafted the Dayton guarantees that were demanded by Serbs and 
Croats in 1995. The European Union and the United States pushed for 
consociational guarantees for Albanians in Macedonia in 2001 in order 
to end an Albanian insurrection; and the European Union, following the 
lead of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, gener-
ally pressured East European states to provide an array of consociational 
guarantees, sometimes including a minority veto, for their minorities.21 
In a series of negotiations for the reunification of Cyprus, the United Na-
tions in 2004 pushed very hard for watertight guarantees, decades after 
such guarantees had produced stalemate, rejection, war, and occupation. 
Greek Cypriot voters rejected the Annan Plan in a referendum in 2004. 
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This account does not include the states in Africa in which insur-
rections were to be ended by consociational accords to place rebels in 
government, though those accords might fail to produce durable peace, 
as in Rwanda in 1993, Angola in 1994, or Côte d’Ivoire in 2003. When 
they acted as mediators, Europeans and Americans (and, for that mat-
ter, South Africans) insisted on the very institutions abroad that they 
disdained at home. 
In short, there tends to be strong external support for consociational 
arrangements, although there are exceptions. In Bosnia, the Dayton 
Accords fell out of favor with Western powers within a few years, for 
reasons that are beyond the scope of this article but have much to do 
with which groups are in favor and which are not. While no fundamen-
tal change was contemplated in Northern Ireland even after protracted 
lapses in the functioning of the Good Friday Agreement, and while 
at the same time the Annan Plan—consociational to the nth degree—
was being pressed on Cypriots, Europeans and Americans were telling 
Bosnians that such arrangements were unsuitable for them and not in 
conformity with entry into the European Union. This was done not-
withstanding the presence of a deadlocked consociational government 
in Brussels, at the heart of Europe. 
The net result of these external preferences was that Bosnia’s minori-
ties would have no international support if they resisted change, while 
other consociations, however deadlocked, would have support not only 
from minorities inside but also from friends outside. Even so, Bosnians 
were resistant to several proposals for vote-pooling electoral systems in 
the late 1990s, then to open Western favoritism toward political parties 
deemed to be moderate on ethnic issues in 2000 and after, and finally 
to various plans to reduce the redundancy of group guarantees and the 
complexity of Bosnian institutions during the next decade. 
Can the Stalemates Be Broken?
Like Bosnia’s arrangements, Northern Ireland’s consociational dispen-
sation generally helped to keep the peace, but it failed to deal with con-
tentious ethnic issues that the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 had speci-
fied for resolution. From about 2007 onward, Burundi also was largely 
peaceful, a remarkable achievement given its history of brutal violence, 
but the Hutu-led government increasingly chafed under the consociational 
restraints that had been imposed in 2005.22 Also peaceful was Belgium, 
which exhibited deadlock as great as that encountered by any other con-
sociational regime and solved that problem, in a manner of speaking, by 
resorting to more and more government in the monoethnic regions of 
Flanders and Wallonia and the 80-percent Francophone region of Brus-
sels, and less and less government at the center. In Belgium, as in the other 
cases, the restless group is the majority (in this case, Flemish), which is 
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more constrained by the regime of guarantees. No one seemed able to 
break the shackles of immobilism. 
Interestingly enough, as the immobilism of consociational institutions 
sets in, in nearly every case some proposals for change are geared to-
ward centripetal institutions, especially vote-pooling electoral systems. 
In the late 1990s, the International Crisis Group published two proposals 
for electoral systems in Bosnia that would allow voters to vote for can-
didates from groups other than their own and encourage candidates to 
seek such votes. The proposals had technical problems that would have 
precluded their adoption in the form proposed, but in 1998 the interna-
tional Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia had declared its inter-
est in a new electoral law to promote a “multiethnic political process” 
by encouraging parties to take account of interests beyond those of the 
groups they principally represented. Ultimately, efforts in this direction 
came to naught when the director of the OSCE office in Bosnia opted for 
a system of open-list proportional representation. 
A proposal for a centripetal system, but with guaranteed propor-
tionality, was also made—and ignored—during what turned out to be a 
desultory review of Northern Ireland’s stalemated Good Friday Agree-
ment in 2003, and renewed negotiations for a Cyprus agreement after 
the failure of the Annan Plan featured a proposal for the election of 
some Turkish officials by Greek voters, and vice versa—a cross-voting 
idea that is not the same as a true vote-pooling system, but that stems 
from a centripetal impulse. Turkish-Cypriot voters rejected the idea at 
the polls in 2010. The Pavia Group in Belgium, a biethnic organization 
of scholars interested in preventing the disintegration of the state, has 
presented a proposal for “a federal constituency,” in which 10 percent 
of the Belgian parliament would be elected by all voters, as opposed to 
the current system in which constituencies are intraregional and intra-
ethnic. Similarly, a member of the Pavia Group has proposed a “multiple 
proportional vote” that would have strongly centripetal features. Among 
today’s strongly consociational regimes, only Burundi has not consid-
ered a centripetal electoral system. 
In no case, however, has a centripetal electoral system been grafted 
onto a consociational political system, so there is no way to see how it 
would have worked. (The hybrid systems of Lebanon and Macedonia 
provide mixed messages about mixed prescriptions.) All of the inhibi-
tions that were described for the initial adoption problem—and more—
hinder this kind of change. 
There are two states, however, that had consociational regimes and 
managed to become majoritarian democracies, but their experiences do 
not point the way forward for deadlocked consociations that are ethni-
cally based. Both in the Netherlands and in Austria, there was “pillar-
ization” of the society, cradle-to-grave compartmentalization. In both 
cases, the cleavages were based on religion and social class, and classi-
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cal consociational methods were employed to manage them (except that 
the Netherlands never had a grand coalition).23
In both cases, however, social change after World War II, especially 
the growth of an urban service sector and a white-collar middle class, 
coupled with secularization of the society and the erosion of what had 
been strong religious affiliations, resulted in a crumbling of the pillars. 
The underlying social compartments, with all their associated organiza-
tions, simply broke down. With the abatement of group conflict due to 
profound social and economic changes, social circles were no longer 
exclusive, and voters were freed to vote outside what had been quasi-
ascriptive party allegiances to which they had previously been tied. The 
result was ordinary majority rule and voter volatility among parties, 
without grand coalitions, vetoes, or any other relic of consociationalism. 
None of this will help those countries in which divisions are strongly 
ethnic, as in Belgium or Burundi, or even ethnonational, as in Northern 
Ireland and Bosnia. These countries have birth-based divisions that are 
more firmly embedded than those based on the mutable religious or class 
affiliations of most of the Western world. For change to be effective in 
ethnically divided consociations, it needs to take place at the level of 
formal political institutions, not at the level of the society in general. 
Are there, then, any sources of change that seem plausible for immo-
bile consociational regimes? Adding a centripetal electoral system might 
have a serious effect, but if parties and politicians with strong ethnic ori-
entations have the whip hand, moderate ethnically based parties and poli-
ticians may fear to join together across the ethnic divide. In such cases, 
it is likely that they will be accused of selling out group interests. Some 
such dilemma seems to characterize the predicament of moderate Prot-
estant unionist and Catholic nationalist politicians in Northern Ireland. 
They periodically make noises about coalescing but are unable to do so 
because they are flanked by larger ethnic parties that are less inclined to 
compromise. Laurent de Briey has perhaps summed the problem up best: 
The only hope of seeing the adoption of [a conciliatory electoral system] 
seriously debated among political parties [in Belgium] would be if this 
reform were advocated by moderate people inside all of the main par-
ties. Those people could be motivated by their common opposition to an 
electoral system which, fostering ethnic radicalisation, entails their mi-
noritisation in their respective parties. More realistically, we may expect 
one party to promote [such a system] in order to dissociate itself from the 
ethnic discourses of the other parties.24
This does seem to suggest possible paths to change, but although there 
are moderates in all such societies, none seems able to break the mold.25
The most likely route to serious change for a stalled consociation 
lies in some unpredictable crisis not necessarily related to the conflict 
that produced the consociational regime—a shock that makes stalemate 
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intolerable, neutralizes minority objections, and renders quick action 
necessary. This is typical of agenda-setting events,26 and it provides an 
advantage to those who have solutions ready and are merely waiting for 
problems to develop that can make their solutions attractive. Like most 
events that trigger major institutional changes, this kind of event may 
have too much urgency to allow much deliberation. 
Three Problems, No Answers
This brief tour of three neglected problems of ethnic accommodation 
and democracy provides no easy answers. Rather, it suggests prospects 
for a great deal of stasis in remedying problems of ethnic conflict. 
The first problem, concerning the difficulty of adopting any accom-
modative institutions in the first instance, is so intractable that many 
troubled states in need of conciliatory institutions and inclined toward 
democracy will have great difficulty adopting either consociational or 
centripetal institutions. Instead, they are likely to opt for a form of de-
mocracy to which they are accustomed—namely, straightforward ma-
jority rule with minority rights. Such a choice is likely to disappoint 
on both counts. Without electoral incentives for conciliatory behavior, 
majority rule will become ethnic-majority rule. Minority rights will be 
inadequately enforced, because the majority will be likely to control the 
courts. 
Some states may borrow an odd device here or there, perhaps after 
a crisis is brought to compromise by an international mediator whose 
only interest is to restore the peace. Some of these states may stumble 
upon institutions that aid in conciliation; most will not. Many attempts 
to reach power-sharing agreements fail altogether, and an authoritar-
ian regime of ethnic domination may set in, with or without a lapse 
(or a relapse) into civil war. Even where power-sharing institutions are 
adopted, majorities will generally chafe under them. No constitutional 
engineering is fail-safe, even if it can be accomplished initially. Actors 
will seek to reverse conditions they find to be unfavorable. 
The second problem, involving the degradation of centripetal elec-
toral institutions by a variety of majority manipulations that cannot be 
checked by a judiciary enforcing political bargains, has no easier answer 
than the first. Making bargains more explicit and public is, perhaps, one 
way to make them harder to break, but even then, as the conditions un-
derlying them change and the returns to the parties from them prove to 
be uneven over time, there is no assurance that they will not be altered 
in an ethnically exclusive, majoritarian direction. 
The third problem, entailing the possibility of escape from conso-
ciational immobilism, seems very difficult. We have considered five 
of the most prominent and complete consociational systems that have 
so far been adopted. In one, Cyprus, the majority terminated the ar-
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rangement within three years of its inception, with disastrous results. 
Subsequently, each of the sides in turn has refused to become entangled 
in another arrangement to reunify Cyprus. The other four countries sub-
sist in various forms of stalemate, so far relatively mild in the cases of 
Northern Ireland and Burundi, very severe in Belgium and Bosnia. The 
route to amendment looks blocked. If centripetal institutions may be in-
sufficiently sticky, over time consociational institutions tend to become 
excessively sticky. 
Proponents of consociational and centripetal measures to achieve in-
tergroup accommodation in a democratic setting have been too sanguine 
about the prospects for adopting them, for maintaining them when ma-
jorities can find ways of altering agreed arrangements, and for changing 
them when particularly rigid arrangements lead to stalemate and major-
ity restlessness. Many states that need conciliatory institutions will not 
get them; others will not keep them if majorities are able to break out 
of them; and still others will not change them when stalemate indicates 
that change is necessary.
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